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According to Positioning Theory, participants in narrative interaction can position
themselves on a representational level concerning the autobiographical, told self, and
a performative level concerning the interactive and emotional self of the tellers. The
performative self is usually much harder to pin down, because it is a non-propositional,
enacted self. In contrast to everyday interaction, psychotherapists regularly topicalize
the performative self explicitly. In our paper, we study how therapists respond to clients’
narratives by interpretations of the client’s conduct, shifting from the autobiographical
identity of the told self, which is the focus of the client’s story, to the present performative
self of the client. Drawing on video recordings from three psychodynamic therapies
(tiefenpsychologisch fundierte Psychotherapie) with 25 sessions each, we will analyze
in detail five extracts of therapists’ shifts from the representational to the performative
self. We highlight four findings:
• Whereas, clients’ narratives often serve to support identity claims in terms of personal
psychological and moral characteristics, therapists rather tend to focus on clients’
feelings, motives, current behavior, and ways of interacting.
• In response to clients’ stories, therapists first show empathy and confirm clients’
accounts, before shifting to clients’ performative self.
• Therapists ground the shift to clients’ performative self by references to clients’
observable behavior.
• Therapists do not simply expect affiliation with their views on clients’ performative self.
Rather, they use such shifts to promote the clients’ self-exploration. Yet, if clients resist
to explore their selves in more detail, therapists more explicitly ascribe motives and
feelings that clients do not seem to be aware of. The shift in positioning levels thus
seems to have a preparatory function for engendering therapeutic insights.
Keywords: psychoanalysis, conversation analysis, positioning, interpretation, psychotherapy, social interaction,
self
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INTRODUCTION
The self is far from being a unified notion (e.g., Neisser, 1988).
This holds also true for different facets of the self, which may
be at issue in social interaction. As Bamberg (1997), Lucius-
Hoene and Deppermann (2004), Bamberg and Georgakopoulou
(2008), and Deppermann (2015) have argued, positioning of
selves in narrative interaction can occur on at least two levels:
A representational level concerning the autobiographical, told
self, and a performative level concerning the interactive and
emotional self of the teller. The performative self usually is much
harder to pin down, because it is non-propositional and enacted.
In everyday interaction, it is unusual to explicitly describe aspects
of the partner’s performative self. Psychotherapy is different: in
their interpretations, therapists regularly topicalize aspects of the
performative self explicitly, in particular those that the client does
not seem to be aware of, but may offer insights into the client’s
problems. One environment in therapist’s responses shift to the
client’s present performative self are autobiographical narratives
by the client that serve to support a certain identity claim made
by the client.
Such shifts are sensitive moments in the therapy. They imply
that the therapist claims epistemic authority concerning the
client’s current feelings, motives, or the interpretation of their
behavior. This is in contrast to the usual assumption in Western
cultures that the subject has privileged access to the self (Heritage,
2011; Gertler, 2020). Drawing on video recordings from
three psychodynamic therapies (tiefenpsychologisch fundierte
Psychotherapie) with 25 sessions each, in this paper, we analyze
five extracts in which the therapist’s interpretation shifts to
the performative self of the client in response to a client’s
story. We first introduce Positioning Theory as an approach to
conceptualize and study the self in (narrative) interaction on
the basis of audio and video recordings (section Positioning
in Narrative Interaction). Section Client’s Self-Positioning and
Therapist’s Shifts to the Performative Self lays out the generic
sequential structure of episodes in psychotherapy in which
therapists shift from clients’ autobiographical narratives to
their performative self, including the ensuing negotiation of
therapists’ interpretations by both parties. After a description
of data and methods used in this study (section Data and
Methods), the main body of the paper is devoted to the
in-depth analysis of five extracts in which therapists shift
to the client’s performative self in their sequential context
(section Shifts to the Performative Self in Psychotherapy:
Five Exemplary Cases). Section Conclusion summarizes and




Narratives are the primary mode of self-reference in
psychodynamic therapy (Boothe, 2004, 2010). Clients tell
biographical episodes, recent events, dreams, etc. Yet, already
early on, the psychoanalytic talking cure has involved not
only recollection but also the focus on the client’s repetition
of entrenched behavioral patterns in the therapeutic situation
(Freud, 1924[1914]). More recent approaches to psychoanalysis
highlight this interactive dimension of psychotherapy as
being crucial for change (Streeck, 2004). Well-known
psychoanalytic phenomena like resistance, transference, and
counter-transference operate mainly on the interactional level
(Greenson, 1978). Yet, in modern versions of psychoanalysis,
this highly asymmetric understanding of the psychotherapeutic
relationship, which presupposes a knowing analyst vs. a
client who is unaware of their psychodynamic motives,
is replaced by a more symmetrical understanding of an
intersubjective field to which both client and analyst are
equally contributing. Interpretation in the post-bionian
model of the analytic field “is no longer considered as
the expression of the analyst’s knowledge about the client,
but as a multidimensional offer of meaning intended to
bring new ideas and emotions to life at an intersubjective
level” (Civitarese, 2020).
In this paper, we draw on Positioning Theory for the
analysis of different facets of the self that are treated as
relevant in psychotherapeutic interactions. Bamberg (1997)
and Bamberg and Georgakopoulou (2008) distinguish between
level-1 positioning, involving the self “as a character in
the story” (Bamberg and Georgakopoulou, 2008: 380), and
level-2 positioning, the way in which the teller “positions
himself (and is positioned) within in the interactive situation”
(Bamberg and Georgakopoulou, 2008: 385). Lucius-Hoene and
Deppermann (2004) and Deppermann (2015) have elaborated
this model, distinguishing representational positioning of the
autobiographical, told self, and performative positioning of
the emotional and interactive self. Performative positioning
is implicit and importantly includes bodily displays.
Both modes of positioning are manifested by different
discursive practices:
• Representational positioning of the told self includes
◦ description of actions, feelings, thoughts, intentions, etc. by
narrative clauses;
◦ ascriptions to present and past self;
◦ enactment by reported dialogue;
◦ reported statements by third parties;
◦ metanarrative comments on and categorizations from past
or present point of view;
• Performative positioning of the emotional and interactive
self includes
◦ claims to facets of identity by narrative performance and
interactional conduct;
◦ affective displays by prosody, facial expression, gaze, etc.;
◦ positioning vis-à-vis the interlocutor.
Positioning involves not only self-positioning but also other-
positioning, i.e., the ascription of facets of identity to the
interlocutor (or third parties), which can also be done both by
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explicit representations or in a performative mode. Self- and
other-positioning can imply each other, as, e.g., when adopting
performatively the role of a teacher, the addressee is other-
positioned as a student.
Positioning Theory seeks for an analysis of identities as
they become referred to and indexed in narrative talk-in-
interaction. Conversation Analysis (Schegloff, 2007) equips us
with the methodology of sequential analysis, which is needed
to show how participants observably orient to situated facets
of identity in their interactions and how they understand,
treat, and negotiate identity displays. Positioning Theory is
compatible with conversation analytic views on the self in
interaction (Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2003). It encompasses
membership categorization (Jayyusi, 1984), but it can also
address how participants recognizably orient to moral concerns
of the self, i.e., the participant’s face (Goffman, 1955). Yet,
the Positioning approach goes beyond these two approaches
by attending to the biographical and to the psychological
dimensions of the self as well as they become manifest in
interactional episodes (e.g., bodily self-perception, reflexive
self-positioning, and ascription of feelings and motives;
Deppermann, 2013).
CLIENT’S SELF-POSITIONING AND
THERAPIST’S SHIFTS TO THE
PERFORMATIVE SELF
Our study deals with narratives in psychotherapy that clients
themselves interpret in terms of their personal identity. Thus,
we deal with sequences of interaction in which the self is
undoubtedly in focus for the participants. In the same way
as Vehviläinen (2003) and Voutilainen et al. (2010) have
shown, therapists in our data mostly initially respond with
empathy or partial agreement with the client’s identity claim.
However, they never respond with unrestrained agreement or
displays of reciprocity, e.g., by a second story about own
experiences, as has been shown in other interaction types by
Heritage (2011) and Kupetz (2016), but which would violate
the neutrality requirement of the psychoanalytic technique.
Instead, they provide candidate understandings (Weiste and
Peräkylä, 2013), which may even be challenging (Antaki, 2012),
and continue their turns by producing interpretations that
attribute unconscious motives or unavowed feelings to the
client (Greenson, 1978: 37–45; Peräkylä, 2008; Weiste et al.,
2015).
The type of sequences we will discuss has the
following shape:
- 1A: Story-telling: Client (CL) tells autobiographical story.
1B: Identity claim: CL interprets story in terms of
identity ascription.
- 2A: Display of empathy: Therapist (TH) provides display of
empathy and/or partial agreement.
2B: Interpretation: Therapist shifts focus to the client’s
present, performative self, pointing out identity aspects
that contrast with, undermine, or reframe the client’s self-
ascription. This shift to the performative level is brought
about by focusing on the client’s present behavior, their
feelings (Peräkylä, 2008; Voutilainen et al., 2010), and/or the
(unconscious) motives that make the client tell their story.
The focus on the client’s performative self can combine with
a focus on how the client manages the relationship with
the therapist.
- 3: Negotiation of the interpretation: Therapist and client
negotiate the meaning or the validity of the therapist’s
interpretation (Peräkylä, 2005, 2010). This part will minimally
consist of the client’s response to the therapist’s intervention
2B, but may extend to a larger negotiation of interpretations
and ascriptions to the client; it can also include argumentative
and narrative elaborations.
In this paper, we examine (1) how clients in psychodynamic
psychotherapy interpret their own autobiographical narratives
in terms of who they are (Bamberg, 2011), (2) how therapists
respond to narratives by interpretations shifting to clients’
performative self, and (3) how both parties negotiate the
meaning and the validity of the therapist’s interpretation of
the client’s self, focusing on whether both parties manage to
arrive at a shared understanding of the client’s identity, motives,
and feelings.
DATA AND METHODS
We draw from two psychodynamic focal therapies with 25
sessions each, video-taped at the Medical Faculty of the
University of Freiburg, Center for Psychiatry, Psychosomatic
Medicine and Psychotherapy in 2017–2018. Excerpts 1–
3 from the first therapy include a male client in his
late 60’s suffering from depression and a functional pain
syndrome subsequent to the death of a family member. The
young female therapist was still in her analytic training.
Excerpts 4 and 5 are from the second therapy with a young
woman in her 20’s suffering from psychogenic seizures.
The therapist was a psychoanalytically trained senior
staff member.
All sessions were exhaustively coded for all occurrences
of different types of therapists’ responses like understanding
checks, repetitions, formulations, and interpretations. Fifty-
five instances of therapists’ interpretations were transcribed
according to GAT2 (Selting et al., 2011, with selected
additional multimodal annotations, Mondada, 2018; see
Appendices A, B) together with their sequential context (with
a duration between 1:59 and 7:01min), i.e., preceding client’s
narratives and descriptions and following negotiations of the
interpretation. All 55 extracts were analyzed by the three
authors together using Conversation Analysis with a focus
on sequential organization and turn design. Among the 55
extracts, 5 extracts (out of 10) in which the therapist shifts
to the performative self of the client have been chosen for
this paper.
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SHIFTS TO THE PERFORMATIVE SELF IN
PSYCHOTHERAPY: FIVE EXEMPLARY
CASES
In the following, we analyze in depth five extracts in
which therapists respond to clients’ autobiographical
self-positioning by shifting to performative aspects
of client’s current self. We have chosen extracts
that give evidence of the various dimensions of
the performative self that therapists address in
their interpretations:
- Unconscious motives that inform client’s storytelling (section
Redefinition of the Motives for Storytelling: From Identity-
Display to Defense Mechanism),
- emotions that are in contrast to client’s explicit self-
presentation (section Inference From Presuppositions
in the Client’s Story: From Rational Self-Presentation to
Emotional Distress),
- the client’s way to conduct the interaction with the
therapist (section Interpreting the Client’s Way of
Designing the Psychotherapeutic Relationship: Claiming
an Analogy Between Agentive Self-Relationship and
Interpersonal Relationship),
- different objects or causes for the client’s emotion (section
Observing Non-verbal Conduct: Focusing on an Emotion and
Shifting its Object),
- a challenge of the authenticity of the client’s representational
self-positioning (section Summarizing Impressions
From Client’s Talk: Challenging the Authenticity of
the Performance).
Each section closes with a conclusion concerning the
positions that the participants accomplish with respect
to the client’s self in the extracts: client’s representational
self-positioning is summarized and related to how the
therapist other-positions the patient by shifting to the client’s
performative self.
Redefinition of the Motives for Storytelling:
From Identity Display to Defense
Mechanism
Extracts 1–3 are from the first therapy with a young
female therapist and an elderly male client. One of the
recurrent topics of the sessions are CL’s conflicts with
authority figures, which had also been discussed before
extract 1 starts. The client tells a story about a conflict
with a superior at work as evidence for how he acquired
psychological strength. The therapists shift to the motives for the
client’s storytelling1.
1Transcript headers designate the therapy series (I or C), number
of session, and beginning and end time of the extract within
the session.
Extract 1 | Therapy_I_12_44:10-48:40
001 CL da ischt dann an diesem meine STÄRke entstande;
there then at this my strength developed
002 (0.54)
003 CL an dEm TAG,
on that day
004 TH [HM_hm–]
005 CL (.) wo sie_s jetzt mir dann geSAGT [hat, =]




position of the head nurse
008 (0.69)
009 CL kriegt die Ulli?




013 CL und es wär LIEB,
and it would be kind
014 (0.13)
015 CL und k
and
016 (0.18)
017 CL tOll von dir wenn du sie EINarbeiten würdsch,
great if you introduce her to the work
018 (0.29)
019 CL un sie k äh als stEllvertr[etung weiter]hin
ARbeiten würdscht.
and will carry on working as vice head
020 TH [HM_hm,]
021 (0.38)
022 CL ((lipsmack )) un ich gesagt liebe SILke,
((lipsmack)) and I said dear name-superior
023 (1.11)





028 CL SO: (0.34) lass (0.12) ich (.) nIcht (.) mit mir
(.) UMgehen.
I won’t let me be treated that way
029 (0.64)
030 CL ich hab (0.15) äh drEI viertel jahr die
staTION geführt;
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035 (0.12)
036 CL [da gab_s] (.) KEIne beschwerde;




102 CL un NE, =
and no
103 =ich hab noch zu ihr geSAGT; =
I said to her still
104 =äh SILke, =
erm name-superior
105 =ich nehm jetz meinen RESCHTurlaub,
I now take my residual leave
106 (0.52)
107 CL und dann äh äh äh wirscht du mir nicht
mehr SEHen.
and then erm you won’t see me again
108 (0.1)
109 TH HM_hm;
110 CL ja du KANNscht aber net einfach so:-
well but you cannot simply like this
111 (0.36)
112 CL und da hat aber diese SCHULleitung;
and there this director of the nursing school
113 (0.24)
114 CL der hat mir dann gHOL[fe,]
he helped me then
115 TH [HM]_hm,
116 (0.21)
117 CL und hat mir dann quasi
kein KÜNdigungsvertrag; =
and then did not (give) me like a
cancelling contract




121 CL <<decr > und konnt [ich als sch]ulassistent
anfangen >.




cl ∗puts hand on his chest—- >
125 (1.1) ∗
Cl —->∗
126 CL es [koscht] mich immer noch; =
it still costs me
127 TH [hm;]
128 CL =∗aber TRAUT hab ich mich;
but I dared to
cl ∗smiles slightly———- >
129 (0.5)
130 TH <<p> haben sich DURCH ∗gesetzt; >
(you) prevailed
cl ———————————————————————————————∗
131 CL <<p> hab mich DURCHgesetzt >;
(I) prevailed
132 (1.2)
133 TH auf mal so_ner ganz AN:deren ebene; =
just on a very different level
134 =also_s THE:ma, =
so the topic
135 =mit dem wir ja ANgefangen haben die stunde; =
with which y‘know we have started this session
136 =war ja (.) eben der neuroLOge?
was y’know PTCL the neurologist
137 ((lipsmack))
138 CL hm_[HM,]
139 TH [äh:]m (.) der die rolle sp




143 TH der so: MACHT noch hat so in ihren gedanken,
who still has kinda power like in your thoughts
144 (0.5)
145 TH ah:m; (0.6)
erm
146 TH wo sie sich NICHT durchsetzen konnten.
where you did not prevail
147 TH (.) d[er irgendw]ie:-
who somehow
148 CL [hm_HM.]
149 TH ◦h (.) un jetz haben sie mir (.) ganz
viele geSCHICHten
erzählt? =
and now you have told me a whole lot of stories
150 =von denen die [ganze STUNde]über,
of which the whole session long
151 CL [wo des gekLAPpt] hat,
where it worked






156 TH (.) und
and
157 (1.15)
158 TH ich frag mich ist das so_n mechaNISmus
von ihnen; =
I wonder is this kinda mechanism of you
159 =dass sie sich dann dA dran erINnern?
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that you remember that then
160 ◦h ((lipsmack)) u:m (.) sich so !SE:LBST! (.)
äh:m (0.21) zu zei:
((lipsmack)) erm in order to erm sho- yourself
this way
161 (.) also nochmal AUFzuzeigen:; =
I mean display once again
162 =da gIbt_s auch situationen wo ich das
meistern KONnte?
there are also situations in which I ( = client)
could cope with that
163 (0.53)
164 damit sie sich weniger SCHWACH fühlen? =
so that you feel less weak
165 =in den ANderen situationen; =
in the other situations
166 TH =so was ist (0.64) die ROLle (.) dieser
geschichten und dieses
167 (.) dieses erzählens [da(bei),]
so what is the role of these stories and this
this telling there
168 CL [das isch_ne] des
isch_ne SAche,
this is a this is a thing
169 CL (0.4) da gebe sie mir jetz en SCHLÜSsel?
there you now give me a key
170 (0.44)
171 TH hm_HM,
172 CL (0.2) weil sie des jetz SAge,
because you say this now
173 (0.6)
174 CL des HILFT mir,
this helps me
175 (0.35)
176 CL weil dann werde ich in ZUkunft, =
because then I will in the future
177 =wenn da mal wieder irgendwie was ISCH oder so,
if there is just again something or so
178 CL ◦h (.) werde ich mich (.) ÖFter mal an
diese situationen erINnern.
I will just remember these situ ations more often
179 (0.52)
180 TH ◦h [ ◦h]
181 CL [wo isch] STARK war;
when I was strong
182 (0.73)
183 TH ich hab das nich ich ich [((knarrt))]
I have that not I ((creak))
184 CL [NE des:]
no this
185 ich glaube ich wollte jetz erstmal nur so (.) in
FRAge stellen. =
I guess I wanted now first just only
kinda question
186 =was sie damit MACHen; =
what you do with them ( = the stories)
187 =ich hab jetzt
I have now
188 ◦h (.) ich !WEISS! nicht ob es die passende
strateGIE [is.]
I don‘t know if it is the proper strategy
189 CL [hm]_HM–
190 TH ◦h so_s war einfach nur_ne FRA:ge von dem (.)
was hier
pasSIE:RT. =oder?
like it was simply only a question about what is
happening here, right?
Client Tells a Story of Prevailing Over an Authority
Figure and Interprets it in Terms of Strength (001–131)
The story preface: (“my strength developed on that day,” “da
ischt an diesem meine STÄRke entstande; an dEm TAG,” 001-
003) projects an autobiographical key narrative. It is a story
about pride and self-assertiveness when facing a threat of
devaluation: The client considers himself to be treated as unfair
and disrespectful, because he is not appointed as a ward nurse,
although he fulfilled this position for 9 months perfectly well and
without any complaints (30–36), was praised by the doctors and
proved to be a responsible and strict leader of his team (between
38 and 102, not shown). The climax of his story is a reported
interaction with his superior, in which he rejects the request to
introduce the new ward nurse to her work; instead, he cancels his
job on the spot (103–110) and changes to another position that
was offered to him in a neighboring nursing school (112–121).
The final morale frames it as a story about courage (124–128) in
the face of an unjust authority, who does not respect him.
The Therapist’s Response: Inquiring Into the
Motivation for Telling Stories of Strength
As a first reaction, the therapist shows understanding and
empathy by collaboratively formulating the gist of the story
as “you prevailed” (130), which is confirmed by the client’s
repeat (131). The therapist then announces to switch to a
“completely different level” (133). She refers back to the stories
that the client told over the course of the sessions (135–152)
and puts forth the hypothesis that the client tells stories of
strength in order to fight feelings of weakness (149–165). In
psychoanalytic terms, the client’s stories are interpreted as a
variety of the defense “mechanism” (158) of reaction formation
(Freud, 1937). This can be conceived of as resistance against
facing the painful feeling of being left out. The categorization
as a “mechanism” (158) of the client implies that there is a
motivational process the client is not aware of. The therapist’s
intervention is clearly not affiliative. It treats the kind of
stories the client tells as a behavior in need of psychological
analysis. However, the psychoanalytic term “mechanism” may
not be transparent to the client, who therefore misses that it
hints at questionable motives in need of further exploration
(see step 3).
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Ensuing Negotiation: Useful Self-Management
Strategy vs. Object of Motivational Inquiry
The client does not take the therapist’s intervention up as a cue
for questioning his hidden motives. Instead, he treats it as a
recommendation of a self-management technique to fortify his
identity when he feels shaken (168–181). The therapist disclaims
that it was her intention to recommend using stories of strength
as a self-management technique. By his third-position repair
(Schegloff, 1992), she rejects the client’s response as resting on
a misunderstanding of her interpretation; instead, she insists on
questioning the use of this strategy (183–190).
Self- and other-positioning in extract 1
In Extract 1, the client positions his told self mirrored by the
perspectives of third parties: He is treated disrespectfully by
superior vs. praised by doctors and supported by the head of the
nursing school. Third parties serve as warrant of his entitlement
to the position he is denied and to his moral rights against
his superior, who disrespects him. The client explicitly claims
and narratively displays an identity of strength, which he has
acquired by a courageous act. The story is a biographical key
story, which describes a change in the client’s identity by his
own agency against all odds and which establishes an important
link between the client’s former and his present self. The story
is presented as a warrant for the factuality of his identity claim:
the representational level of the story is treated as primary. The
client positions himself by performance as well: His past self is
re-enacted with syntonous affect (indignation, anger), and he
displays pride by smiling when formulating the morale of the
story. Interactively, the client calls for recognition of his courage
and his achievement, inviting affiliation with his identity claim,
maybe even fishing for the therapist’s praise.
The therapist displays empathy with the client and his claimed
self of strength. Nevertheless, she shifts the focus and treats the
performative level as primary by interpreting the client’s story
not as a factual story about the becoming of his identity (=
representational positioning), but as a performative, strategic
self-presentation, whose function is to be questioned, because it
serves to avoid facing experiences and feelings of weakness.
The levels of positioning that client and therapist treat as being
focal are at clash. While the client focuses on the biographical
becoming of his identity, the therapist treats the motivation
for claiming this identity as more important. Yet, the client
does not understand the therapist’s intervention as a cue to
explore his motivations in more detail. Instead, he takes it
up as a recommendation, which supports the psychological
usefulness of his identity claim as a means to enhance his agency
and well-being.
Inference From Presuppositions in the
Client’s Story: From Rational
Self-Presentation to Emotional Distress
In extract 2, the therapist’s interpretation focuses on an emotion
(sadness) that contradicts the client’s overt claim (acceptance)
but is treated as being presupposed by the client’s word choice.
Already in the first session, the therapist and the client talk
about his loss of bodily strength and endurance because of
aging. Comparing himself to others who are worse off, the client
stated: “Ich muss zuFRIEde sein.” (“I must be satisfied,” 05:54).
Afterwards, the client told about the need to be cautious because
of problems with his prostate gland. After the client concludes
his story with an interjection that expresses concern (“HA:I yai
yai,” 03), the therapist refocuses on the client’s prior claim that
he has to be satisfied with his health condition, and casts it into
doubt (13–15).
Extract 2 | Therapy I_1_09:07-10:46
01 CL aber des_sin Immer noch diese (1.0)
diese gSCHICHte;
But these are still always these these stories
02 (0.3)
03 CL die mir (1.04) dann sage HA:I yai yai,




07 TH sie haben Eben gesagt; (0.2)
you just said
08 TH ich !MUSS! (.) zufrieden sein.
I must be satisfied
10 (1.0)
11 TH mit dem (0.9) mit ihrer fitness mit SIEBzig.
with the with your fitness being seventy
12 (1.8)
13 TH dieses !MUSS! (.) klingt so ein bisschen so ∗:-
This must sounds like kinda little bit as if
cl ∗smiles— >
14 (1.0)
15 TH so !GANZ! stehen sie noch nich daH[INter;]





19 CL ja ich würd scho
well I would PRT
20 (0.3)
21 CL ((clears throat))
22 (1.0)
23 CL ich freue mich irgendwie jetz auf den FRÜHling, =
I am looking forward to spring now somehow
24 =und hab halt schon un äh des gFÜHL, =∗
and (I) somehow have erm the feeling
cl —————————————————————————————————————–∗
25 =dass ich äh: auch wenn ich jetz auf_n HIRZberg
äh äh gehe würd;
that I erm even if I now would walk up
the NAME-OF-MOUNTAIN
26 (0.6) ah: (.) oder irgendwo ANdersch,
erm or somewhere else
27 (0.6) da ein steiler BERG (.) bei uns,
there a steep mountain in our region
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28 (0.5) äh da dass ich ((knarrt)) das mit dem:
erm there that I ((creaks)) the thing with the
29 ah: mit der (0.3) i es GE,
erm with the sacroiliac joint
30 (0.3)
31 TH HM_[hm,]
32 CL [sehr wahr]scheinlich (.) ah:: (1.3)
very probably erm
proBLEme kriegen [würde.]
(I) would run into trouble
33 TH [HM_hm,]
34 (0.66)
35 CL des isch_s des geFÜHL isch [da:]
this is it the feeling is there
36 TH [HM_]hm,
37 (1.5)
38 TH genau des_so diese verNÜNftige seite die zu
ihnen sagt,
exactly there is this rational side which says
to you
39 (2.2)
40 CL [isch s]o_ne ambivaLENZ;





43 TH =was mich aber interessiert is so eben auch (.)
die ANdere; =
but what interests me is just also the other
44 TH =so_n bisschen die emotioNAle, =
kinda little bit the emotional
45 TH =vielleicht auch die TRAUerseite;
perhaps also the sadness-side
46 CL hm_[HM;]
47 TH [di]eses ABschiednehmen;
this saying goodbye
48 (0.8)
49 TH von was was sie ihr ganzes leben (1.5)
WICHtig war; =Oder?
to something which your whole life was
important, right?
50 CL ((clears throat))(0.4) schon:;
well that’s true
51 (1.8)
52 CL weil: es ISCH halt SO,
because it is like this
53 (0.4) zum beispiel mein BRUoder.
for example my brother
54 (0.8) der hat zwar auch im KNIE:,
he has problems with his knee as well
55 (.) un der un der leidet immer; =
and he and he suffers always
56 =weiß der TEUfel was alles; =
the devil knows what else
57 =muss aber keine medikaMENte un nix nehme;
but he does not have to take any drugs
or anything
58 (0.6) aber da: (.) der (.) der kann wieder
<<knarrig > äh: > TOUrenschie fahren;
but there he he can erm do ski touring again
Client’s Story (Before the Extract Until Line 03)
The client talked about health problems, his concerns, the need
to be cautious, and his acceptance of his health condition, given
that others are worse off.
The Therapist’s Response: Therapist Doubts That
Client Is Satisfied With His Health Condition (05–15)
The therapist quotes the client’s earlier claim that he must be
satisfied (07–11) and highlights his use of the modal verb “muss”
(“must,” 08), which expresses constraint (Zifonun et al., 1997,
1881–1923). She interprets the choice of the verb as making
perceivable (“klingt so,” “sounds like,” 13)2 that the client is not
fully emotionally ready to accept his situation, or, alternatively,
not fully convinced that he has to accept it (13–15). This
interpretation makes an unavowed emotion explicit (Peräkylä,
2008; Voutilainen et al., 2010) and is clearly designed to achieve
intersubjectivity by referring to common ground concerning the
client’s narrative action in order to persuade him (Weiste et al.,
2015). Yet, the therapist thereby changes from the client’s explicit
self-positioning to an impression she has gained about his present
emotional and cognitive stance toward his health condition that
the client is taken as not having communicated, but given off
(Goffman, 1959) by his linguistic choice.
Ensuing Negotiation: Ambivalence Between Desire
and Physical Limitations vs. Focus on Sadness About
Loss (16–35)
In overlap with the therapist’s interpretation, the client starts to
smile, agrees (16), and then laughs slightly (17), which seems to
index that he feels being understood. He continues by deploying
the imaginary scenario of looking forward to climbing a high
mountain (what has been his favorite hobby), stating that he
would expect to have problems with his sacroiliac joint (17–35).
The therapist confirms and categorizes his account as expressing
his rational side (38), thus constraining its validity as expressing
only one part of the client’s self. The client, in turn, concludes
that there is an ambivalence (between his desire to do sports
and concerns about limitations of his health condition, 40). By
marking a shift in perspective (“the other side,” 43), the therapist
again changes focus to the client’s emotions, now explicitly
introducing sadness about having to say farewell to well-beloved
habits (43–49). Using the format “what interests me is X” (43),
the therapist does not explicitly claim that the client is sad about
having to say farewell, nor does she explicitly ask if this is the case.
Rather, she establishes this emotional state as a thematic focus
(43–49). Using the demonstrative article (“this saying goodbye,”
2See Stukenbrock et al. (submitted) for the use of meta-perceptual verbs in
therapists’ interpretations.
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47), she presupposes that it is relevant for and known by the
client, urging him to elaborate with a tag (49; König, 2020).
The client grants the therapist’s intervention by a concessive
particle (50); he expands his turn by a story about his brother,
who, in contrast to the client, is still able to practice physically
demanding sports, although he suffers from various illnesses as
well (54 until beyond the extract). This story of social comparison
implicitly avows discontent and the feeling of injustice of not
being able to perform any more like significant others of about
the same age. The client thus partially aligns with the therapist in
exploring his emotions concerning physical limitations further,
however, without dealing with the emotion of sadness about loss
in particular.
Self- and other-positioning in extract 2
The client positions himself as a person who is fond of doing all
sorts of physical activities and sports, but who is concerned about
his condition because of health problems that have increasingly
developed with age. He conceives of himself as being in an
ambivalent position, torn between the desire for bodily activities
and the acceptance of increasing physical limitations.
While confirming the client’s self-positioning and his
pragmatic orientations, the therapist focuses on the client being
emotionally more affected from the sadness about losses related
to aging than he seems to admit. Her first intervention closely
builds on the client’s prior words and, drawing on a semantic
presupposition of his statement, she infers emotional trouble on
his part concerning age-related changes in his health condition
(07–15). As the client does not take up the issue of exploring
the emotions that might cause his “not fully being behind” his
acceptance, the therapist explicitly states “sadness about loss”
as a topic, an emotion that she at least tentatively attributes to
the client.
The explicitation of the inference from the client’s linguistic
choice is thus a means to cue the client’s self-exploration in
the direction of the therapist’s hypothesis. As the client does
not take this direction, in her second intervention, the therapist
formulates the inferred emotion explicitly, thus showing more
clearly that she ascribes to the client a motive or feeling that he
did not address yet.
Interpreting the Client’s Way of Designing
the Psychotherapeutic Relationship:
Claiming an Analogy Between Agentive
Self-Relationship and Interpersonal
Relationship
In extract 3, the therapist draws an analogy between the topic of
the client’s story (self-control) and his interactional conduct (his
attempt to control the therapeutic relationship).
Throughout the therapy, the client repeatedly reports about
measures he takes in order to preserve his health. The therapist
comments on one of these stories by ascribing to him that he acts
“well-organized, well-reasoned and controlled” (082–084).
Extract 3 | Therapy I_14_32:23-38:25
078 TH =äh äh sie sind ja: sehr bemÜht glaub ich auf
VIElen Ebenen, =
erm erm you are y’know very eager on many levels
079 =die: WEGzubauen; =
to discard
080 =also sie sind ja gehen ja auch aktiv DRAN. =
I mean y’know you are y’know you actively
081 =<<creaky > ja >,
yes
082 (0.3) aber auch imme::r se:hr (0.1) organiSIERT; =






086 CL aber wisse sie wo des HERkommt; =
but d’you know where this comes from
087 =weil ich viel im GLETscher gelernt hab.
because I have learnt much in the glacier
(…)
144 und die (.) die hÖchste äh äh
konzentrationsübunge (0.3) sind
beim FELsenklette[rn,]
and the highest erm erm concentration exercises
are when climbing rock mountains
145 TH [hm]_HM,
146 (1.3)
The Client’s Story: Autobiographical Self-Positioning
as Acting With Care and Concentration
The client seems to receive the therapist’s comment about him
acting well-organized, reasonable, and controlled (082–084) as
praise. He responds by telling a story about how he learned to act
with great care and concentration when climbing in the glaciers
(086–144). This story expands a series of autobiographical stories
in which he portrays himself as exerting agency (080) in a
cautious and well-planned manner (082–084).
The Therapist’s Response: Shift to the Way in Which
the Client Manages the Therapeutic Relationship
The therapist first confirms the client’s autobiographical identity
claims (147–161), but then shifts to his behavior in the
therapy (162–176).
Therapy I_14_32:23-38:25 continued
147 TH ne ich glaub sie haben VIEle sachen in ihrem
lEben gemacht, =
well I guess you did many things in your life
148 =wo sie sehr viel kontrOlle: (0.2) und
konzentration dfür geBRAUCHT haben.
where you needed very much control
and concentration
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149 CL (0.2) ja:,
yes
150 TH (und ja) das hat ihnen sehr sehr viel geNUTZT, =
and yes this has helped you very very much
151 =in vielen situationen in ihrem leben KLAR
zu kommen.
to come to terms with many situations in
your life
152 CL (0.1) hm;
153 TH sowohl im SPO:RT; =
both in sports
154 =als ouch in ihrer A:Rbeit; =
and in your work as well
155 =wo sie auch va (.) viel [verant]wortung
überNOMmen ha:ben;





158 TH (0.5) und SO,
and so on
159 ◦h (.) un ich glaube des-
and I guess this
160 (1.8)
161 TH des is ja in ihnen DRIN.
this is inside you y‘know
162 (.) ((schmatzt)) ◦h un ich hab mAnchmal das gefühl
dass sie das
auch hier bei UNS (0.34) sehr machen.
((lipsmack)) and sometimes I have the feeling
that you do this
here with us very much as well
163 (.) also dass sie sehr
kontrolLIE[ren; =
I mean that you control very much
164 =was][sie e]rZÄ:Hle[n;]
what you tell
165 CL [wenn ich][mit ihnen] [S]PRECH;
when I talk with you
166 TH (0.1) ja:,
yes
167 (0.9)
168 TH äh:m; (0.2) un mi:r (1.1) mich auch nur zu_nem
gewissen gra::d
(.) ihnen HELfen lassen oder so. =
erm and (that you) let me (1.1) me help you only
to certain degree or so as well
169 =also so sehr vorgeben_n THEma?
I mean like you predefine a topic
170 (0.7)
171 TH un mir so_n bIsschen was erLAUben?
and (you) allow me a little bit
172 (1.0)
173 TH a::be::r da ouch_ne kontROLle drin lassen, =
but you still keep some control
174 =wie viel mir pasSIERen darf in der therapie. =
how much may happen to me ( =client) in
the therapy
175 =und wie viel geSAGT werd[en darf.]
and how much may be told
Re-using her notion of “control” as a leitmotif of her
interpretation of the client’s self (084, 148, 163, 173), the therapist
confirms that the client has come to terms successfully with
many situations in his life (148–155) by “very much control
and concentration” (148). She concludes that this strategy is
deeply rooted in the client’s self (159–161). She continues
by drawing an analogy between the way in which the client
controls himself and his life outside of the therapy with his
verbal behavior in the therapy and the way he manages the
therapeutic relationship (162–175). She claims that the client
controls topics and the ways in which they are talked about
(164, 169, 175) in a way that limits the scope of therapeutic help
from her (168, 176).
Ensuing Negotiation: Denial of Limited Openness vs.
Claim to Resistance Out of Fear
The client insists on the wish that the therapist helps him
(177–186) and affirms that he wants to engage fully with the
therapist (188–189). Yet, while accepting the authenticity
of the client’s wish (267–275), the therapist reframes
her assumption that the client resists against giving up
control (277–289).
Therapy I_14_32:23-38:25 continued
177 CL [ich WÜNsch m]ir
I wish
178 ich WÜNsch mir
I wish
179 (0.6)
180 CL vielleicht sehen sie das SO:,
perhaps you see it this way
181 (0.6)
182 CL wenn sie des so empFINde, =
when you feel it this way
183 CL =Isch es [aber] in mir net SO.
but in me it is not this way
184 TH [hm–]
185 TH (0.1) hm_HM,
186 CL ich WÜNsch mir dass sie mir helfe.
I wish that you help me
187 TH (0.2) hm_HM,
188 CL (0.2) ich würd
I would
189 ich wünsch mir (0.2) dass ich mich richtig schön
auf sie EINlasse kann.
I wish that I can really fully engage with you
(…)
267 TH hm des war auch gar nich als VORwurf von mir
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[gemeint; =
mmh I didn’t mean it as a reproach at all
268 CL [ne NE;]
no no
269 TH =des war einfach] so als_ne beSCHREIbung;
it was simply like as a description
270 TH ◦h (.) [und sie] haben das jetz so geSA:GT, =
and you now have said it this way
271 CL [ja,]
yes
272 TH =und ich glaube ihnen ihren WUNSCH auch; =
and I believe you that this is your wish
273 =also [((creak))] (0.7) müssen sich keine
SORgen machen;=
so (you) don’t have to worry
274 CL [hm_HM;]
275 TH =dass ich ihnen (.) das nich ABnehmen würde;
that I don’t buy this from you
276 CL ◦h sie haben des
you have this
277 TH (0.2) da klang wie so_n ABer mit (0.1) in
ihrem satz.
it sounded like in your sentence a “but”
was included
278 (.) als sie gesagt haben sie WÜNschen sich das?
when you said you wish this
279 (1.1)
280 TH aber es gibt
but there is
281 (.) als gäbe_s Irgendwas was auch
daGEgen spricht.




284 TH gib[t_s da ir]gend_nen WIDerstand; =
is there any resistance
285 =oder_ne AN:gst, =
or a fear
287 =auch davor vielleicht was dann: (0.1)
pasSIEren könnte; =
also about what perhaps then could happen
286 =was dann RAUSkommen könnte;
what could come out then
288 (1.5)
289 TH was passiert wenn sie die kontROLle auf
(.) geben,
what happens if you give up control
290 (0.6)
291 CL WISse sie;
look
292 (1.6)
293 CL (doch/durch) des dass ich
(but/by) that that I
294 (0.3)
295 CL ((clears throat)) ich kann_s immer (.) nur
(.) wiederHOle,
I can always only repeat
In response to the therapist’s ascription that the client controls
and limits topics (162–176), the client claims his wish to be
helped by the therapist and to engage fully with the therapist
(177–189). Therapist and client thus express oppositional views
on the present, interactive self of the client concerning his aim for
interactional control and openness. The client’s lengthy account
of his wish to open up fully to the therapist, which is continued
in the elided part of the excerpt (190–266), is responded to by the
therapist by an overt action ascription: she denies that her prior
action was to be understood as a “reproach,” but recategorizes
it as a “description” of the client’s way of interacting in the
therapy (267–269). She adds that she believes in the seriousness
of his wish to be helped by her (272–275). Both concessions are
designed to discard the impression that seemed to underlie the
client’s affirmations, namely, that the therapist attacks the client’s
moral self in not believing in his authentic and unrestrained
engagement in the therapeutic relationship. As before (078–
084, 147–161), the therapist takes care to explicitly confirm
the client’s own positive identity claims (267–273). Yet, these
affiliative affirmations are only preliminaries to insisting on her
prior ascription that he is afraid of losing control (277–291). She
first claims that the client “sounds” (277) as if his talk included an
unspoken concessive part, a “but” (277). This time, the therapist
not only reiterates the ascription of “control” to the client (289)
but also adds more far-reaching motivational ascriptions, asking
whether there is “resistance” (284) or “fear” (285) in the client
against giving up control. Although the therapist’s interpretation
is couched in terms of an interrogative, her insistence on the topic
and the evidence from the sound of his talk clearly show that
she assumes the client to exhibit resistance. Starting in 291 (and
continuing beyond the extract), the client reaffirms that he fully
engages in the therapy, while conceding that he may not seem to
be as “relaxed” as the therapist might want him to be.
Self- and other-positioning in extract 3
The client positions his autobiographical, told self as acting
cautiously, planfully, and with a large amount of concentration,
i.e., as a person with a high degree of agency. In response to
the therapist’s challenging ascriptions, he explicitly positions his
present, interactive self as engaging fully with the therapy in order
to get optimal help.
The therapist fully affiliates with the client’s explicit self-
positioning, which she explicitly confirms. She uses the
psychoanalytic technique of proving the lingering relevance of
past experiences for the client’s present self by claiming that the
client re-enacts biographically entrenched patterns of interaction
in the therapy (Levy, 1998). By this, the therapist shifts from the
level of the client’s autobiographical self-positioning to the client’s
interactive, present self by way of analogy. The client is other-
positioned as acting in a way that is unnoticed by himself and
contradicts his explicit claims. The therapist makes a distinction
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between believing the client’s intentions (not to control and
restrict his performance in therapy) and her assumption that the
client does not act according to what he claims, thus introducing
the distinction between a conscious and an unconscious self of
the client as an interactionally relevant reality.
Over the extended negotiation about the relevance of
“control” to the client’s actions beyond and within therapy,
therapist and client do not reach an agreement about how to
conceive of the client’s interactive self. While both agree on the
client’s explicit self-ascriptions, the therapist claims that there
are additional unconscious motives, which run counter to the
intentions of the conscious self. Yet, the therapist unpacks these
motivational ascriptions only after the client has not accepted her
ascription of a controlling behavior in the therapeutic context and
has not engaged in self-exploration concerning the possible motif
that the therapist has ascribed to the client.
Observing Non-verbal Conduct: Focusing
on an Emotion and Shifting its Object
In extract 4, the therapist focuses on an emotion (sadness) that
the client expresses mainly non-verbally and he shifts the object
of the emotion to a more self-related concern.
Extracts 4 and 5 come from the second therapy with a
senior male therapist and a female client, who suffers from
psychogenetic seizures. The client has just told her boyfriend that
she breaks up their relation. She talks about her concern that,
after they separated, she won’t be able to help him anymore.
Extract 4 | Therapy C_20_20:34-22:50
01 CL also ich BRAUCH das nich dass ich irgendwem (0.2)
so HELfe; =s
I mean I don‘t need it that I help anybody
02 (0.6)
03 CL eher darum dass (0.6) äh:m (2.3) ◦h mein HERZ
dabei (0.7) extrems wEh tut;
rather it’s about that erm my heart is
aching extremely
04 TH hm_HM;
05 CL bei dem gedAnken dass ich ihm dann





09 CL ja, =nicht mehr n:: ja; =
well no more/ well
10 =ihn nicht AUF:fangen kann,
not being able to catch him
11 TH hm_[HM,]
12 CL [nicht HELfen] kann, =einfach
not being able to help simply
13 (0.4)
14 CL dess: (0.1) er dass ihm halt nicht GUT geht.
that he that he just is not well
15 TH (0.1) hm_HM,
16 (0.8)
17 CL dass dass er
that that he
18 (1.2)
19 CL ich könnte locker drauf verZICHten,
I could easily do without
20 CL ((aborted laughter)) <<laughingly > ihm zu
HELfen >; =aber






25 CL nur wenn_s ihm dann GUT geht.
only if he is well then
26 (0.5)
27 TH HM_hm;
28 ∗ (3.0) ∗(3.5) ∗ (3.7) ∗ (2.7) ∗(1.5) ∗ (6.5) ∗
Cl ∗nods 3x ∗ ∗nods 2x ∗crisps lips ∗ ∗crisps/bites lips ∗
29 ∗ (5.7) ∗
Cl ∗eyes fill with tears ∗
30 TH ((lipsmack)) (.) so_n bisschen traurig macht sie
das SCHON dieser gedanke. =ne?
it makes you kinda little bit sad though
this thought
31 (0.5)
32 CL ((lipsmack)) <<f > ja:; >=
yes
33 =∗auf jeden FALL, >
definitely
cl ∗smiles———->
34 CL [jaha;] ∗
yes
cl ——–>∗
35 TH ja [da]ss ihre wege jetzt auseinANder gehen, =
well that you will be going separate ways now
36 =dass sie (0.76) ihm danach nich (0.46) nich mehr
that you him afterwards no no more
37 (0.3)
38 TH ((lipsmack)) <<creaky > ja >.
yes
39 TH ((lipsmack)) HELfen können.
will be able to help
40 CL (0.2) ja.
yes
41 (6.5)
42 CL ◦h da muss ich halt wIrklich auf mich AUFpassen,
I really just have to take care of myself
43 (0.3)
44 CL wenn ich dann zu HAUse bin,
when I will be at home then
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45 (0.3)
46 CL ◦hhh dass ähm: (1.8) ja, =ich dann nich so (2.9)
in diesen
(0.8) in diese TRAUer; =
that erm well I then don‘t drown so much in this
in this sadness
47 =schmErz oder so was da (0.5) hiNEINverfalle (.)
pain or kinda something of that kind
[sozu]sagen; =also ◦h
so to say I mean
48 TH [hm;]
49 (1.9)
50 CL dass mich das nicht zu:: (0.3) se:hr EINnimmt;




54 CL sondern dass ich halt auf MICH (.)
natürlich gUcke;
but of course that I just look after myself
55 CL (.) auf mich AUFpasse,






60 TH ◦h des is ja sicher WICHtig;
this is certainly important
61 (0.5)
62 TH andererseits ein bisschen (0.75) auch die
traurigkeit spÜren
◦h hilft vielleicht (.) dann auch (.) sich
innerlich (1.3)
dann auch noch mehr (0.3) zu verABschieden.
on the other hand a little bit also to feel the
sadness perhaps
then also helps to say fare well still
more mentally
63 (0.8)
64 CL ja, =auf jeden FALL;
yes definitely
65 (0.8)
66 TH <<p> gehört halt daZU, >
y’know it’s part of it
67 (0.3)
68 CL <<creaky, p > ja >;
yes
The Client’s Story: Concern About Her
Boyfriend (01–25)
The client had told about her boyfriend’s eating disorders and his
problems to come to terms with his life. She tells that she feels
bad when thinking that she won’t be able to help him anymore in
the future after they split. In the lengthy pause that emerges after
her account (28–29), the client nods several times and looks away
from the therapist; she crisps and bites her lips; her eyes begin to
fill with tears.
The Therapist’s Response: Focus on the Client’s
Emotion (30–39)
The therapist provides an interpretation that assigns an explicit
emotional interpretation to the client’s non-verbal conduct (cf.
Muntigl and Horvath, 2014): “it makes you kinda little bit sad
though this thought” (30). The modal particle “schon” indexes
a concession that the therapist expects the client to make, thus
showing that he conceives his interpretation to be at least partially
different from her explicit self-presentation (30). The client
confirms without reserve, slightly smiling (32–34). However, the
therapist continues his turn by explicitly adding a formulation
of the object of her sadness, namely, the separation from the
boyfriend (35), which is different from what the client had talked
about before, i.e., the inability to support her boyfriend anymore
(see 09–12). Still, the therapist then realigns with the client’s prior
focus of not being able to help anymore (36–39).
Ensuing Negotiation: Joint Shift to Client’s
Self-Related Emotions and Need for Coping
Taking up the therapist’s ascription of sadness (“traurig,” 31 →
“traUer,” 46), the client elaborates on it by claiming that she will
have to take care of herself by not letting herself drown in this
emotion (42–55). The therapist explicitly agrees (60), but then
claims that the client will need to face the sadness about the
end of the relationship in order to be able to say farewell and
psychologically cope with it more comprehensively (62). Both
agree (64–68).
Self- and other-positioning in extract 4
The client first explicitly positions herself as being distressed by
not being able to comply with the exigencies of her moral ideal
self concerning the support she should provide her boyfriend.
The therapist does not question the explicit self-positioning
of the client. Rather, he gradually shifts the focus away from
the boyfriend and the client’s moral self to her own emotions
(Peräkylä, 2008; Voutilainen et al., 2010) caused by the experience
of the split-up and the need to cope with them properly. This
change is managed by attending to the client’s performative,
non-verbal displays and by topicalizing their emotional content.
The therapist’s shift from the client’s explicit self-positioning as
being concerned about the loss of her ability to help her boyfriend
to the emotion of sadness implies a shift in focus from the other-
related concern about the boyfriend to the client’s emotional self.
This combines with a shift of the object of the emotion, namely,
from the loss of the ability to help to the loss of the relationship
itself. This shift paves the way for the therapist’s permission to
allow for her sadness sufficiently in order to be able to cope
with the separation from the boyfriend. The therapist’s shift to
the client’s performative self is thus used as a cue to enhanced
emotional self-exploration by the client, on which the therapist
builds his recommendation.
The client aligns with the therapist’s shift to her performative
emotional self and affiliates with his statements. The shift
in focus establishes the common ground between therapist
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and client about the client’s emotional state that is needed
as a basis for the intelligibility and acceptability of the
therapist’s recommendation.
Summarizing Impressions From Client’s
Talk: Challenging the Authenticity of the
Performance
In extract 5 from an earlier session, the therapist seemingly
gives just a summary of the client’s prior talk, which, however,
can be heard as challenge building on the impression that the
client interactional performance conveys. The client had talked
for the first 11min about her current life situation (preparing
university exams, leisure-time activities, boyfriend, and plans to
move to another town). She stated that she did not suffer from
seizures recently, but reported eating problems, which, however,
she claimed to be under control of “her head” (01–06).
Extract 5 | C_2: 11:10-12.40
01 CL ja. =aber darauf (0.31) schaltet sich mein kOpf
meistens dann ganz gut EIN.
but then mostly my head intervenes properly
02 TH HM[hm,]
03 CL [und der sa]gt (.) hier (.) trotzdem,
and it says nevertheless
04 TH (0.36) HM_hm,
05 CL <<p> iss > trotzdem [(so)]
eat nevertheless so
06 TH [sodass das gewicht] jetzt nicht
zu stark
nach UNten gegangen [ist] bis jetzt.




08 TH oder nicht GEhen (wird).
or (will) not decrease
09 TH ◦h
10 (1.39)
11 TH ((lipsmack)) ja,
yes
12 TH (0.61) ◦h also eigentlich wenn man ihnen
so ZUhört, =
so actually if one listens to you
13 =muss man SAgen,
one must say
14 TH ◦h klingt es so dass sie jetzt im AUgenblick mit
a (0.2)
it sounds as if now at the moment with
15 mit AUSnahme eigentlich dieser (0.44) ◦hhh
körperlichen beschwerden,
with the exception of your bodily problems
16 (.) ihr leben eigentlich so ganz gut im
GRIFF haben. =Oder?
you can cope with your life quite well, right?
17 (0.25)
18 TH hm (.) klingt SO. =Oder?
sounds like that right?
19 TH würden sie,
would you
20 wie sehen SIE das;









28 CL äh:m: (.) bei mir ist es SO dass ich das
ähm: (1.71)
erm with me it is this way that I am able erm
29 gut nach AUßen;




32 CL (0.4) ähm DARstellen kann [glaub ich auch.]
erm to present I guess
33 TH [hm_HM,]
34 TH ◦h ah JA.
oh I see
35 CL also ich (0.25) erTAPpe mich auch;
so I catch myself as well
36 CL (.) !SEIT! diesem klinikaufenthalt hab ich
das geMERKT,
since this stay at the hospital I have realized
37 CL ◦hh äh:m: weil mir des auch da ein therapeut
geSAGT hat,
erm because there a therapist also told me
38 (0.43)
39 CL dass (.) ich ä:hm auf VIEles immer schön
gleich wegLÄCHel?
that I erm in response to many things I always
just smile them away
40 TH hm_HM,
41 CL (0.28) ah:m: und (0.98) wenn ich so EINS zwei mal
über dinge
geSPROchen hab;
erm and when I like once or twice talked
about things
42 (0.3)
43 CL dass ich dann auch relativ neutRAL.




The Client’s Story: Presentation of a Rational and
Trouble-Free Self (Until 05)
The client tells about various domains of her life, mostly
smilingly. She does not mention major problems and presents
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herself as a well-organized and goal-oriented person by her
account. Her health problems are only addressed in response to
an inquiry by the therapist; yet, they are portrayed by the client
as being under her control.
The Therapist’s Response: Challenging the
Impression the Client Gives by Mirroring (06–20)
The therapist completes and thereby confirms the client’s story,
stating that she manages to control her weight appropriately
(06–08). He summarizes the impression created by the client’s
account with “you can cope with your life quite well” (16).
This summary is framed by verbs of perception (12, 14,
18) as how the client “sounds” when “listening” to her.
In particular, the concluding repeat “klingt SO. = Oder?,”
“sounds like that, right?” (18) can be heard as a challenge,
because again the perceptual impression that the client’s story
conveys, but not its truth, is highlighted. The tags oder?
(“right,” 16, 18; see König, 2020) and the following questions
(19–20) explicitly ask the client to take a stance on this
impression, thus implicitly calling, or at least allowing, for the
client’s self-repair.
Ensuing Negotiation: Client Admits Insincerity
With the ambiguous response token “jein” (a blend of yes and no),
the client indexes that no straightforward answer is possible and
projects a complex elaboration (Bücker, 2013). The client avows
that she is able to give a favorable, unproblematic impression
“to the outside” (28–32), thus letting infer that this does not
correspond to how she actually feels. When saying that she
“catches herself ” (35) when “smiling away many things” (39), she
adumbrates that this is a habitual way of presenting herself that
she herself often is not aware of, but was only averted to by a
former therapist (37).
Self- and other-positioning in extract 5
The client initially positions herself as a rational, goal-oriented
person, who can cope with the (minor) troubles she faces.
The therapist confirms this positioning, yet by stressing its
perceptual nature and explicitly asking for the client’s take
on this impression, he implicitly leaves room for doubt and
indexes the need for deeper elaboration concerning the validity
of the client’s self-positioning. The therapist does not explicitly
other-position the client. In response, the client avows a lack
of sincerity in her self-presentation, distinguishing a habitual
facade of unproblematicity for others from the real self3,
which, however, she does not elaborate on in the context of
the extract.
CONCLUSION
In Western culture, there is a deep-rooted assumption that
subjects have privileged access to their own self (Heritage, 2011;
Gertler, 2020). This assumption is embodied in most interaction
types in the preference not to question subjective experience and
3The client’s distinction between a publicly displayed and a real self is reminiscent
of Reich’s psychoanalytic account of the “facade” (Reich, 1933) and Goffman’s
socio-psychological account of self-presentation (Goffman, 1959).
self-related statements, but instead to affiliate with them and
show empathy. Yet, the rationale of almost every psychotherapy
includes to cause psychological change by altering clients’ self-
perceptions, self-ascriptions, and understandings of motives and
goals by the therapist’s interventions. This includes questioning
the client’s epistemic authority on their own self, which is a
sensitivemove that has to be carefully considered each time anew.
One way to question the client’s authority concerning their self
is to shift from the client’s focus on their autobiographical, told
self of which they are conscious to their performative self, which
they enact in the interaction with the therapist. This latter self
usually is rather, in terms of Goffman (1959), “given off” than
part of what the client intentionally conveys about their self. In
psychoanalytic terms, addressing the performative self thus often
means to address unconscious and sometimes conflictual aspects
of the client’s personality, feelings, and motives. Prior research on
interpretations has shown that they regularly include ascribing
emotions to the client that they have not explicitly addressed
or even seemed to hide (e.g., Vehviläinen, 2003; Peräkylä, 2008;
Voutilainen et al., 2010; Muntigl and Horvath, 2014). Our
analyses show that shifts to the performative level of client’s
conduct therapists’ interpretations can still address other facets of
the client’s self. In particular, they can concern motives for their
interactional conduct that the client did not address in their talk,
claims about how the client designs the current interaction with
the therapist, a shift in causes or objects that are seen as causes
for the client’s emotions, and challenges of the authenticity of the
client’s self-positioning, again pointing to unavowed motives and
emotions of the client. The shift to topicalizing such performative
aspects of the client’s conduct amounts to a severe face threat in
at least two ways: epistemically, the client is treated as not being
(fully) authoritative on their own self; morally, the adequacy
of the client’s behavior, their goals, and motives are put into
question. Thus, psychotherapists are faced with the dilemma to
get clients to conceive of their selves in new and often oppositive
ways, but yet to respect the clients’ face.
In the data, we could see that therapists deal with this dilemma
by a particular design of the interpretations that address the
performative self of the client as the therapist perceives it in
situ. Therapists produce lengthy multi-unit turns that start with
a display of understanding and empathy with the client that
explicitly ratify the client’s perspective. Only after this do they
turn to a competing perspective that the client does not seem
to be aware of, but that is treated as equally or even more
important, ascribing behaviors, motives, and feelings that are
different from the ones the client has addressed (extracts 2–
5) or that serve as a motivational explanation (extract 1). This
competing perspective is not just posited, but argumentatively
backed with reference to the client’s own prior talk (Weiste
et al., 2015), to a common ground that has been built earlier in
the psychotherapy, general world knowledge, and the therapist’s
own imaginations concerning the told episodes. Thus, the
interpretation is not just delivered as a unilateral observation
from a more authoritative, expert position, but therapists try to
ground it intersubjectively in joint observation of the client’s talk
and behavior and their shared interactional history. Furthermore,
the therapist’s interpretation is introduced in a more or less
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tentative, hypothetical way (see Stukenbrock et al. submitted),
which invites the client to self-explore further in the direction of
the self-aspects that the interpretation points at. This observation
corresponds to current conceptualizations of psychoanalytic
interpretation (Heimann, 2016; Civitarese, 2020) that stress its
intersubjective and relational aspects.
Yet, this complex and careful design of the therapist’s
shift to the client’s performative self does not always cause
clients to align with it, agree with the therapist’s interpretation,
and indulge in enhanced self-exploration (as in extracts 1,
4, and 5). They may resist (extract 3) or confirm only
partially or in passing without entering into a more detailed
exploration of the interpretive perspective that the therapist
offers (extract 2). In addition, as extract 1 has shown,
there may even be a deep misunderstanding between client
and therapist in the sense that the client overtly agrees
with the therapist, while misconstruing the therapist’s action
and assessment.
We found that the therapists’ shift to the performative
self involves focusing on the client’s feelings and motives,
but less on categorical psychological or moral identity claims
(e.g., strength, rationality, honesty), which are focal in clients’
stories. Thus, different facets of the self matter to different
participants. While prior research on psychotherapy has shown
that therapists’ interpretations attend in particular to emotions
that the client did not address, the positioning perspective
adopted in this paper enlarges the picture of how therapists
attend to latent psychological aspects. Psychodynamic therapists
are more generally sensitive to the here-and-now performance of
the client, which importantly includes their ways to conduct the
interaction with the therapist, their bodily displays and motives
that their discursive actions make available for the therapist. In
this way, therapists attend to a larger notion of the client’s self that
transcends autobiographically based narrative representations in
favor of the vision of a performative self that reveals itself in the
ways it acts in situ.
Sequential analysis of the negotiations between client and
therapist following the therapist’s shift to the performative
self show that such shifts promote the therapeutical agenda
by inviting the client’s self-exploration (cf. Peräkylä, 2010).
Therapists do not necessarily expect clients to confirm straight
away the interpretations that they tentatively offer about the
client’s self. Rather, they use them to elicit and deepen the client’s
self-exploration, which does not always have to follow closely
along the lines of what the interpretation has suggested. Rather,
the interpretation can be treated by both parties as a starting
point for exploring a better understanding of the client that is
to be worked out collaboratively. However, if the client resists
to this elicitation, therapists insist on their interpretation, often
couching it in more definite and more saturated terms (Will,
2016), making it less tentative (as in extract 3). The shift in
positioning levels thus seems to have a preparatory function
for promoting the therapeutic agenda and for engendering
therapeutic insights, which build immediately on what is
intersubjectively observable in the client’s multimodal conduct.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A | Transcription Conventions GAT 2 (Selting et al., 2011).
[ ] overlap and simultaneous talk
= immediate continuation with a new turn or segment, latching
◦h/h◦ in-/outbreaths of ∼0.2–0.5 s duration
◦hh/hh◦ in-/outbreaths of ∼0.5–0.8 s duration
(.) micro pause, estimated, up to 0.2 s duration
(0.5) measured pause
and_uh cliticizations of units
uh, uhm, etc. hesitation markers, so-called “filled pauses”
: lengthening, by about 0.2–0.5 s
:: lengthening, by about 0.5–0.8 s
((laughs)) description of laughter and crying
<<laughing>> comment on speech delivery with indication of scope
SYLlable focal accent
sYllable secondary accent
!SYL!lable extra strong accent
? rising to high
, rising to mid
– level intonation
; falling to mid
. falling to low
<<p>> piano, soft
<<f>> forte, loud
<<decr> decrescendo, becoming softer
(may i) assumed wording
Appendix B | Multimodal Transcription Conventions (Mondada, 2018).
** Gestures and descriptions of embodied actions are delimited
between two identical symbols (one symbol per participant) and
synchronized with correspondent stretches of talk.
*−−− > The action described continues across subsequent lines.
−−−− > * until the same symbol is reached.
—- Action-apex is reached and maintained.
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